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ABORIGINAL WATER RIGHTS*
JAMES L. MERRILL**

Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from
part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather

reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate
to the same term and one of them is known. Aristotle, Analytica
Priora69a (McKeon ed., 1941).

I. INTRODUCTION
An aboriginal water right, one which was the first of its kind in a
region, is based on the use of water from earliest days.' While "aboriginal" is a relative term, the existence of a water right which
predates federal sovereignty is sufficient to render that right aboriginal vis-a-vis the United States. Philosophically, aboriginal rights rest
on the familiar "first in time, first in right" dictum which governs
prior appropriation water law. However, the early dates and uncertain quantities attendant to aboriginal rights pose a threat already
familar to prior appropriation water users confronted by federal
reserved rights. Yet aboriginal rights constitute a potentially greater
threat to present water users because they may displace federal water
rights as well as those held under state prior appropriation law.
Prior appropriation water law, as adopted by most western states,
rests on four elements: (1) diversion and application, (2) of a fixed
amount of water, (3) to a beneficial use, (4) on a given date. Non-use
of an appropriative right for a long enough time will result in its
loss.2 Federal reserved rights are the antithesis of this system because
they do not honor these fundamental requirements. The federal
reserved rights doctrine states that whenever the United States sets
aside land for a specific purpose (thereby withdrawing that land from
the public domain), there is implied (if not expressed) a concomitant
*© Copyright 1979 by James L Merrill. This article would not have been possible
without the help and advice of Philip B. Davis, Esq., of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Responsibility for the views and opinions in this material is, of course, the author's.
**Associate Attorney: Yegge, Hall & Evans, Denver, Colorado; Member of the Bar of
New Mexico and Colorado.
1. Compare WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 3 (1975) with WEBSTERS
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 4 (College Ed. 1958).
2. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 293-99 (1967).
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federal intent to reserve sufficient unappropriated water to fulfill the
purposes for which the land was reserved.'
Federal reserved rights do not depend on the prior appropriation
requirements listed above and, furthermore, may not be lost by nonuse. State appropriators with post-reservation priority dates risk
having their water uses displaced by federal water requirements that
can be satisfied under a long-existing but dormant reserved right.4
Similar to federal reserved rights, aboriginal rights exist without
the confines of prior appropriation. Aboriginal rightholders naturally
agree that the date each water right (of whatever type) was created
establishes its seniority in the hierarchy. This, of course, puts aboriginal right holders at the top of the list above all federal and state
water rights.
Given their potential impact, aboriginal water rights are the subject of surprisingly little law. Although aboriginal rights were judicially decreed in a 1935 Arizona case and exist as pueblo water rights
in California and New Mexico, little has been heard about them until
recently. Native American Indian tribes have begun to claim they
have always held and now hold aboriginal water rights. Several factors have combined to bring these claims to court. Many Indian
domains are situated on or near vast deposits of coal and uranium ;'
water is required to develop these energy sources.6 Growing energy
demands and the strategic incentive to increase reliance on domestic
energy sources have renewed the impetus for a definitive resolution
of the conflicting state, federal, and Indian claims to western water.
This article explores aboriginal water rights which exist today and
speculates concerning the form these rights might assume in the
future. New Mexico land grant law, the California pueblo rights doctrine, and the Winters doctrine of federally reserved Indian water
rights all lend guidance to an examination of aboriginal rights. I will
survey these doctrines and attempt to fit aboriginal rights into a
historically coherent scheme consistent with existing water law. The
strongest claim to aboriginal water rights belongs to the Indian
3. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
4. As a practical matter, the disruption to administration of water rights has not been as
severe as the doctrinal clash between reserved and appropriative theories might suggest.
Until a federal reserved right is exercised, the water necessary to satisfy that right may be
diverted by appropriators under state law, even though some of them may have a priority
date junior to the establishment of the reservation.
5. See, e.g., Northern Great Plains Resource Program Draft Report at V-21, III-1 (September 1974); Northern Great Plains Resource Program, Declaration of Indian Rights to the
Natural Resources in the Northern Great Plains States (June 1974).
6. Kneese & Brown, Water Demands For Energy Development, 8 NAT. RES. L. 309
(1975).
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pueblos along the middle Rio Grande in New Mexico. The history of
these pueblos and the pending litigation concerning Indian pueblo
water rights furnish an excellent backdrop against which we can
examine specific attributes aboriginal water rights might assume.
Widespread recognition of aboriginal water rights would raise a
host of new issues. Do these rights extend to groundwater? How
should an aboriginal right be quantified? To what purposes may
water diverted under an aboriginal right be put? Do state courts have
jurisdiction to determine the existence and scope of aboriginal
rights? We will touch these issues and conclude with some ideas
concerning how aboriginal rights might affect existing federal and
state water rights.
Depending on their particular histories, claimants to aboriginal
water rights fall into one of three loosely defined groups. When
European explorers first ventured into North America they encountered nomadic Indians who were hunting and fishing on large territories, as well as settled agrarian tribes who farmed smaller domains.
While the nomadic Indians used water principally for domestic purposes (although farming was not uncommon), the settled tribes
diverted water through ditches for irrigation. Many of the nomadic
tribes have been displaced onto reservations but many of the settled
tribes remain on their original territory. The Spaniards called the
former group Indios Barbaros and the latter, Indios Naturales or
Indios de los Pueblos.'7 Spain and Mexico drew sharp distinctions
between the legal status of these two groups of Indians, as did the
United States until the early twentieth century.
The third group holding aboriginal rights derives from the European settlement of North America. Many Spanish explorers settled
into civil pueblos, established religious missions, and set up military
and presidial towns in the New World. These Spanish and Mexican
pueblos trace their land and water rights to grants from the Spanish
and Mexican sovereigns to the original settlers. 8
By contrast, the Indians do not base their aboriginal claims on
European grants. Indian rights stem from the tribes' original occupation and dominion over the land and water for centuries before the
Europeans arrived. The Indian theory of aboriginal rights views the
"grants" to the tribes as mere quitclaims which did nothing but
confirm and officially recognize pre-existing Indian rights.
7. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 383 (1971).
8. For a vivid description of the documents and ceremony of such grants, see, e.g., Bond
v. Unknown Heirs of Barela, 16 N.M. 660, 120 P. 707 (1911); Catron v. Laughlin, 11 N.M.
604, 72 P. 26 (1903).
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The distinctions between these aborigional rights theories are
important to bear in mind. Although some acts of Spain, Mexico,
and the United States applied to all three groups (nomadic Indians,
pueblo Indians, and pueblo Europeans), the discrete legal effects on a
particular group depend on its individual history. The common
denominator among all three groups is that each had some form of
vested land and water rights before the United States asserted sovereignty over their territories. With respect to the United States then,
all of these rights (whatever their nature and scope) are technically
aboriginal.
Before delving into legal theories, we will examine an aboriginal
water right claim. In 1974, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council
made the following resolution:
[The Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Indians of Montana] does hereby

claim and assert the right of said Indians to, and does hereby notify
all persons, firms, corporations, states, and the United States, and all
agencies and political subdivisions of said states and of the United
States that the Northern Cheyenne Tribe is entitled and now has and
at all times had, the first, paramount and aboriginalright to the use
of all waters herein referred to including all waters flowing or lo-

cated in streams which have their source of water supply upon said
Indian reservation or which have their source of water supply outside the boundaries of said Indian reservation, or both, including all

sub-terranean waters herein referred to, and to all waters that may
now or in the future be artificially augmented or created by weather
modification, by desalination [sic] of present usable water supplies,
by production of water supplies as a by-product of geothermal
power development, or any other scientific, or other type or means
within the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, State of Montana, and hereby declares and claims the aboriginal right to the
appropriation, use and storage of all of said waters for the purpose

of the use of said waters including, but not limited to domestic use,
irrigation, manufacturing, development of natural resources and

development of recreation projects and other facilities;...9
This resolution contains several features of particular significance.
The tribe claims the right to waters on and under its reservation, not
its original lands. Thus, the Cheyenne have implicitly limited their
water claims to their reservation. On the other hand, the tribe claims
all waters connected with the reservation, thereby implicitly rejecting
the Winters doctrine standard which has heretofore quantified most
Indian water rights. (This doctrine is discussed in Section III, infra.)
9. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council Resolution No. 179(74) (March 25, 1974) (emphasis added).
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The groundwater claim may find some support in recent cases suggesting that federal reserved rights extend to groundwater as well as
surface streams.' 0 What the rights to developed water are is anybody's guess, and the legal issues surrounding water rights created by
weather modification remain unresolved.' 1
As advanced by the Indians, aboriginal rights are difficult to fit
into western water law; they would displace state and federal water
rights and give the Indians additional power as water wholesalers in
the West. As recognized thus far by the courts, however, aboriginal
rights have a more subdued character than the Indians ascribe to
them.
II. PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS
Pueblo water rights in some form exist in California, Arizona, and
New Mexico, but each state's treatment of the rights has been
unique. California law concerning Spanish and Mexican pueblo water
rights is by far the most developed. The water rights of many cities,
including Los Angeles and San Diego, are determined by California
law which, like the Winters doctrine, is judge-made law based on
historical implications and is criticized accordingly. An Arizona federal court decreed an immemorial priority date for Indian uses of
Gila River water in 1935, but the circumstances of the case and a
current question concerning whether its holding rests on state or
federal law vitiates its precedential value. New Mexico seems to have
adopted California's pueblo rights doctrine in toto, but the viability
and wisdom of the lone New Mexico case which did so has been
questioned since the day it was decided.
A. CaliforniaPueblo Rights
Under American law, Spanish and Mexican pueblos in California
attained priority over non-pueblo right holders when the California
Supreme Court decided Feliz v. City of Los Angeles. ' 2 In Feliz, the
successors in interest to appropriators who had respected and
acknowledged a superior water right claimed for more than a century
by the pueblo (later City) of Los Angeles were held unable to challenge the city's paramount priority after being silent for so long.
Long before American sovereignty over California, Los Angeles had
10. While Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) suggested that federal reserved
rights extend to groundwater, United States v. Fallbrook, Civil No. 1247 (S.D. Cal, April 6,
1966, as amended, June 27, 1968), held that they do for the Pechanga Indian Reservation.
11. Fischer, Weather Modification and the Right of Capture, 8 NAT. RES. L. 639
(1975).
12. 58 Cal. 73 (1881).
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claimed, and other water users customarily had recognized, that the
city held a first priority water right. Feliz simply formalized the state
of affairs which had existed since the first European settlement of
the region.
Feliz has been criticized because it fails to cite any Mexican law
expressly giving priority to the pueblos,1 3 but a likely explanation
for this lack of reliance on precedent may be that the sparse development in the region at the time the grants were made obviated any
need expressly to set priorities for rights. In eighteenth century California there was plenty of water for everybody. Mexican law did give
non-pueblo riparian landowners a right to use water on the condition
that they did not interfere with pueblo uses.' 4 The Mexican government obviously wanted to insure that its religious and military outposts would not go dry.
Fourteen years after Feliz, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the case's rationale and holding.' I Later cases have given the court
the opportunity to reaffirm the doctrine and clarify its contours. The
needs of the city's inhabitants define the quantity of these rights and
the doctrine "thus insures a water supply for an expanding city."' 6
Pueblo water can be put to any beneficial use within the city limits.
The right extends to groundwater as well as surface streams and the
city's use takes precedence over all others. Pueblo rights cannot be
lost by forfeiture, abandonment, prescription, or estoppel.'I The
United States Supreme Court has refused to review California pueblo
rights because they rest on state law.' I
California pueblo water rights have evolved to provide pueblos and
their successor cities with first priority, expanding water rights which
are immune to the prior appropriation penalty of loss for nonuse.
While the original pueblo grants from Spain and Mexico did not
expressly give priority to pueblo water rights, all non-pueblo rights
were granted subject to the condition that pueblo uses would not be
impaired. The pueblo right's superiority, customarily recognized by
all under Mexican rule, is one aspect of previous law which the
California Supreme Court elected not to alter.
California also has chosen to leave undisturbed the nonforfeit13. Hutchins, Puebo Water Rights in the West, 38 TEX. L. REV. 748 (1960).
14. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674, 715-16 (1886).
15. Vernon lrr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895).
16. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289, 293 (1943),
citing City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 649, 57 P. 585 (1899).
17. For a more thorough summary, see Hutchins, supra note 13, at 751-52.
18. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co., 152 Cal. 645, 93
P. 869 (1908), app. dism'd, 217 U.S. 217 (1910); Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313
(1906) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction).
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ability and expanding aspects of pueblo water rights under Mexican
law, seemingly because all non-pueblo water users have had actual or
constructive notice of the nature of pueblo rights since their inception.1 The California doctrine reaches essentially the same result as
a constitutional or statutory provision which gives preference to
municipal or domestic uses.2 0
B. The Arizona Globe Equity Decree
In 1935, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered an unpublished decree which incorporated a settlement
between the United States and many Gila River valley water users. 1
Although puzzling in some respects, the Globe Equity Decree, as it
has come to be called, recognized an aboriginal water right by awarding an "immemorial date of priority" to rights for the Pima Indians
and other tribes of the Gila River Indian Reservation. While it would
be helpful to an aboriginal rights inquiry to see the findings of fact
and conclusions of law supporting such a decision to award an immemorial priority date, none exist because the decree is not the
product of trial; it was written to effect a settlement reached by the
parties. 2 2
One curiosity of the Globe Equity Decree is that the Apache and
other Indians of the San Carlos Indian Reservation were accorded
rights with an 1846 priority date, 2 3 in contrast with the immemorial
date of the Pima tribes . 2 4 Although the decree contains no explanation for this distinction, it explicitly states that the United States
owns these Indian water rights. The decree speaks twice in terms of
"[tihose [water rights] owned by the United States for and on
account of the Indians of the Gila River and San Carlos Indian Reservations.",2 5 Thus the federal government, not the tribe, owns even
the immemorial right to use water in this case. The basis for this
result is uncertain.
A final point is that the decree apportions successive increments of
Gila River water to both Indian and non-Indian rights established by
the decree. Even though the Gila River Reservation has an immemorial priority date, it does not enjoy absolute seniority in the actual
19. Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881).
20. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §6; N.D. CENT. CODE §61-04-06.1 (Supp.
1979).
21. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29,
1935) (hereafter "decree" or "Globe Equity Decree").
22. Id at 6.

23. Id at 86.
24. Id
25. Id at 6, 86.
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allocation of water. For example, the first 300 c.f.s. of flow is
divided: 60.6 percent to satisfy Indian rights and the remainder to
non-Indian rights. Additional increments are allocated similarly, but
the percentages vary. 2 6 This arrangement requires the Indians to
share shortages of water with other users who hold later priority
dates. This riparian-like result vitiates any real-world advantage which
might be ascribed to the immemorial priority date in this case.
It is unfortunate for the development of aboriginal rights that the
Globe Equity Decree is the product of negotiation rather than litigation. The decree is of little help in determining the factual foundation required to support a water right of immemorial priority. The
disparity in priority dates accorded the two Gila reservations is unexplained, as is the allocation of water between Indian and nonIndian lands; neither result is attractive precedent for tribes evaluating the aboriginal theory. Federal ownership of even the
immemorial right threatens the tribes with state court adjudication
of aboriginal rights, 2 7 and litigation is pending to determine whether
the Globe Equity Decree rests on state or federal law. 2 8
C. New Mexico
New Mexico's rich history provides fertile ground for the assertion
of aboriginal rights. Before its exploration and conquest by the Spanish military, New Mexico was inhabited by both Indios Barbaros and
Indios de los Pueblos. The Indios Barbaros, some of whom hold
Winters doctrine reserved rights, now claim that those rights are but a
federal recognition of their aboriginal rights.2 9 The precise scope of
the water rights of some of the Indios de los Pueblos is being litigated
30
in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
Further complicating the situation is the New Mexico Supreme
Court's 1959 adoption of the entire California pueblo rights doctrine, in a case which has never been cited but has been frequently
and vociferously criticized since it was handed down. Finally, some
New Mexico land grant law may be helpful for thinking about aboriginal water rights.
26. Id. at 92-93.
27. Although the fact that the decree was negotiated rather than litigated undoubtedly
detracts from its precedential value.
28. United States v. Smith, No. 78-1869 (9th Cir., filed April 19, 1978).
29. Indeed, a literal reading of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the
doctrine's namesake, suggests that Indian reserved and aboriginal water rights often may be
the same.
30. New Mexico v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M. filed April 20, 1966). This case is on
remand from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See note 42, infra.
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1. The Cartwright Decision
In 1914 and again in 1938, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected claims of the existence of pueblo water rights for Spanish and
Mexican pueblos. In the first case, the court found that no pueblo
existed and consequently there could be no pueblo water right . 3 In
the second case, the court acknowledged the existence of the pueblos
claiming rights, but found that the lack of a grant from the King of
Spain to the pueblos was fatal to their claim for pueblo water
3
rights. 2
In 1950, Cartwright and other private water users along the
Gallinas River, a tributary to the Pecos River, brought suit against
the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), seeking to enjoin
diversions made by the company on behalf of the Town of Las
Vegas, which had contracted with PNM to supply water for the
town. The town intervened, claiming that as the successor to a community land grant made by the Mexican government in 1835, it held
pueblo water rights under which PNM, pursuant to a contract with
the town, was lawfully diverting water for municipal use. In upholding the diversions by PNM in Cartwright v. Public Service Co.,3 the
New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the California pueblo water
rights doctrine and stated that the reasons which had prompted the
California Supreme Court to uphold pueblo water rights applied with
as much force in New Mexico as in California.
The Cartwright case has been criticized on the basis that New
Mexico was not compelled to adopt California state law 3 4 and
should not have done so. The New Mexico court had available to it
more accurate and complete translations of Spanish and Mexican
laws concerning pueblo water rights than did the California Supreme
Court when it first embraced the pueblo water rights doctrine a
century ago. Critics argue that the New Mexico Supreme Court
should have made its own examination of prior law and based its
ruling accordingly, rather than follow relatively uninformed rulings
of the California Supreme Court. s
31. State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P.
207 (1914).
32. New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 315, 77 P.2d 634,
639 (1938).
33. 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654, 668 (1959).
34. If the California Supreme Court had articulated the doctrine as a product of federal
law, the United States Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction to review the California
pueblo water rights cases. The New Mexico Supreme Court, of course, would have had no
choice but to follow these cases or distinguish them.

35. Cartwright v. Public Service Co., 66 N.M. at 87-105, 343 P.2d at 670-82 (dissenting
opinion); Hutchins, supra note 13, at 759-61.
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Cartwright also has been criticized because the historical, factual
bases of notice and estoppel on which the early California cases
relied were not present in the New Mexico case. California water
users have been on notice since the times of the early settlements
that the pueblos claimed paramount water rights. The Cartwright
plaintiffs never knew that the Town of Las Vegas had a superior right
to the Gallinas River; these appropriators labored and used water
with the idea that the town was but another diverter subject to prior
appropriation. Little could they have realized, prior to Cartwright,
that the town would be endowed with expanding, preferred rights
under the law of another state.
Cartwright's viability today poses an interesting question. The
New Mexico Supreme Court has not cited Cartwright since it decided
the case. The reasoning of two dissenting justices in the case might
persuade the court to limit the case to its facts or even to overrule it
if the opportunity arose.
2. The Rio Grande Pueblos
The most clearcut argument for aboriginal water rights in New
Mexico belongs to the Indian pueblos on the middle Rio Grande. By
the time the Spanish conquistadores first ventured up the Rio
Grande valley, the Indian pueblos in that valley had existed for centuries as independent communities with their own governments and
irrigation systems.' 6 Spanish law treated the pueblo Indians as wards
of the Crown but recognized that the Indian pueblos held "prior
water rights to all streams, rivers, and other waters which crossed or
33 7
bordered their lands. '
Non-Indian encroachment onto pueblo lands created a problem
for the Spanish, as it would later for Mexico and the United States.
Although Mexico granted full citizenship to the pueblo Indians (in
contrast with its failure to accord such status to the Indios Barbaros,
the nomadic tribes), the pueblo Indians remained wards of Mexico
and enjoyed greater protection of their lands and legal rights than did
other Indians.' 8
When the United States accepted the surrender of Mexican sovereignty over most of New Mexico by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
in 1848,11 it agreed to recognize and preserve the liberties and prop36. F. COHEN, supra note 7 at 383-84.
37. H. BRAYER, PUEBLO INDIAN LAND GRANTS OF THE RIO ABAJO, NEW MEX-

ICO (1939).
38. F. Cohen, supra note 7 at 383-84.
39. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922
(1948).
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erty rights granted to inhabitants of the region by Mexico and
Spain.4 0 In fulfillment of this obligation, Congress in 1858 confirmed
the land claims of almost all the middle Rio Grande pueblos. 4 ' Thus, whatever land and water rights the Indian pueblos held
during Spanish and Mexican rule, they retained under United States
sovereignty by virtue of the 1848 treaty and the 1858 confirmation.
Precise determination of the water rights of these pueblos may require a detailed analysis of Spanish and Mexican laws concerning the
pueblo water rights. That such an inquiry may be appropriate has
been suggested
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
42
Circuit.
Unfortunately, the situation is very complex and more than an
analysis of prior law will be required to determine the pueblos'
rights, due to events which have occurred since American sovereignty
was established over the pueblos in 1848. Like its predecessor sovereigns, the United States was unable to prevent white settlers from
moving onto pueblo lands. For nearly four decades, the federal government considered the pueblos beyond the reach of most federal
laws extending special protections to Indians, including those laws
requiring government approval of Indian land sales. 4 1 During that
time many pueblos and individual Indians sold, without government
supervision, lands to whites who bought, settled, and farmed in good
faith. Other settlers simply trespassed on pueblo lands or extended
their domain beyond that which they held legally.
While the laws which fostered white settlement on pueblo lands
were easily changed, the effects of those laws were not. When the
constitutionality of federal control over the pueblos was upheld in
1913," 4 those who had settled on pueblo lands became concerned
about the status of their land titles. A decade of congressional infighting produced legislation designed to sort out the conflicting land
claims and compensate the Indians for any land and water rights
which a Pueblo Lands Board, established by the Pueblo Lands Act of
1924," unanimously voted to vest in non-Indians. Nine years later,
40. Id. arts. VIll and IX.
41. 11 Stat. 374 (ch. V) (1858). Santa Ana Pueblo was confirmed in 1869, 15 Stat. 438
(ch. XXVI) (1869), and Zuni Pueblo in 1931, 46 Stat. 1509 (ch. 438) (1931).
42. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1112 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1121 (1977).
43. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), held that the Indian Intercourse Act of
1834, ch. CLXI, 4 Stat. 729 (1834) did not apply to the pueblos. An 1851 Appropriation
Act, ch. XIV, 9 Stat. 587, had extended all protective federal legislation "over the Indian
Tribes in the Territories of New Mexico and Utah," but Joseph was based on the Court's
view that the pueblo Indians were not "Indian Tribes."
44. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
45. 43 Stat. 636 (ch. 331) (1924).
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federal legislation appropriated additional funds for the land board's
work and detailed procedures to dispose of unclaimed lands.4 6 Section 9 of that act provided:
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner be construed to
deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of a priorright to the use of water
from streams running through or bordering on their respective
pueblos for domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes for the
lands remaining in Indian ownership, and such water rights shall not
be subject to loss by nonuse or abandonment
thereof as long as title
47
to said lands shall remain in the Indians.
In 1966, the state of New Mexico brought a water adjudication
suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to determine the rights to use waters of the Nambe-Pojoaque
River system, a tributary to the Rio Grande, which drains the land of
four Indian pueblos north of Santa Fe, New Mexico. 4 8 These
pueblos, along with the United States in its proprietary capacity I
and as guardian and trustee for the pueblos, became parties along
with about 1,000 private individuals.
In a letter to counsel, the court held that the pueblos were not
entitled to be represented by their own lawyers because tribal interests could be adequately represented by the United States Attorney,
the counsel for their guardian and trustee, the United States. The
court further ruled that the pueblos' use of water was governed by
New Mexico's prior appropriation water law.
On an interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed on both issues and remanded the case
to the district court for further proceedings, which still are in progress. 5 0 Both rulings are significant for aboriginal rights. As discussed
below, aboriginal rights of paramount priority and large quantity
could upset even federal water rights; the court's holding that the
pueblos may be represented by independent counsel' I leaves the
pueblos free to argue the full measure of aboriginal theories unencumbered by the ethical dilemmas which could constrain a United
States attorney pressing for recognition of aboriginal rights.
46. 48 Stat. 108 (ch. 45) (1933).
47. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
48. New Mexico v. Aamodt, Civil No. 6639 (D.N.M., filed April 20, 1966).
49. Although the United States seeks a determination of a federal reserved right for
national forest lands lying within the Nambe-Pojoaque River System, its presence in Aamodt
is primarily for the purpose of representing the interests of the pueblos.
50. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1121
(1977).
51. Id. at 1107.
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The Tenth Circuit also held that "[t I he water rights of the Pueblos are not subject to the laws of New Mexico because the United
States has never surrendered its jurisdiction and control."' 2
III. ABORIGINAL WATER RIGHTS AND THE WINTERS DOCTRINE

Indians have the most colorable claims to aboriginal water rights.
A distinct body of federal judicial law, which has come to be called
the Winters doctrine, establishes Indian water rights on Indian reservations. For most reservations, the quantity of water needed to irrigate all the irrigable land within that reservation defines the amount
of water to which the Indians are entitled.' '
The Winters doctrine began when the United States sued several
non-Indian settlers living on former Indian lands along the Milk River
in Montana. By diverting large quantities of water, upstream settlers
left insufficient water in the river to satisfy the needs of an Indian
irrigation project constructed downstream by the United States on
the Fort Belknap Reservation. The government's suit, in seeking to
enjoin these non-Indian diversions, argued the agreement establishing
the Indian reservation implicitly had reserved irrigation water for the
Indians.
Both the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit5 " and the United States Supreme Court in Winters v. United
States' I agreed with the government and rejected the settlers' claims
that, as lawful diverters under Montana law, they were entitled to
protection against later diversions, including the federal project constructed for the Indians. The Supreme Court reasoned that, as of the
date of the reservation (which predated the settlers' appropriations
under Montana law), water had been reserved for the Indian irrigation project.5 6
Since Winters, later Supreme Court cases have sparked a debate
52. Id at 1112.
53. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to
the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 659-62 (1975). To be exact, the amount of
water to which a reservation is entitled depends on the purposes for which the reservation
was created. While the agriculturally based standard is applied most frequently, courts have
not hesitated to use other measures. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975) (fishing). In
United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979), the court decreed 20 c.f.s.
as the minimum flow necessary to maintain the water temperature of Chamokane Creek at
or below 680 F. and thus preserve the habitat of the native trout historically fished by the
Spokane Indian Tribe. The court then commented that "It]his amount of water will also
suffice to preserve the creek's esthetic (sic) and recreational qualities." Slip op. at 11.
54. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, aff'd, 148 F. 684 (9th Cit. 1906).
55. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
56. Id. at 577.
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concerning who reserved the water-the Indians or the United States.
This controversy is an important one to consider with regard to
aboriginal water rights. Aboriginal Indian dominion over the land and
water is an unspoken assumption underlying the theory that the
Indians reserved land and water for themselves and ceded the remainder to the United States. On the other hand, if the federal
government created the reservation for the Indians, the argument for
aboriginal water rights will at best find no help in the Winters doctrine.
5
Of the reserved rights cases decided by the Supreme Court, two 7
lead to the inescapable conclusion that the United States created the
reservations. In Cappaert v. United States, the Court found that
"[bly the Proclamation of January 17, 1952, President Truman
withdrew from the public domain a 40-acre tract of land surrounding
Devil's Hole." ' 8 Similarly, in Arizona v. California, the Court approved the special master's recommendation quantifying Indian
water rights for five tribal reservations created by the United States
along the lower Colorado River.' I
A careful reading of Winters itself leads to the unsatisfying conclusion that the United States and the Indians together agreed to reserve
the water. There the Court said, "The case, as we view it, turns on
the agreement of May 1888, resulting in the creation of the Fort
Belknap Reservation." ' 60 The Court had no doubts concerning the
federal power to reserve the waters: "The power of the government
to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under
state laws is not denied, and could 6 not
be .... That the government
1
decided.
have
we
them
reserve
did
In answer to the argument that the Indians' right "was the bare
right of the use and occupation [of the reservation] at the will and
sufferance of the Government of the United States, ' 6 2 the circuit
court had declared that the trial court was correct in holding that,
"when the Indians made the treaty granting rights to the United
States, they reserved the right to use the waters of the Milk
River." ' 6 Affirming the lower courts, the United States Supreme
Court pointed out the "reservation was part of a very much larger
tract which the Indians had the right to occupy and use"' 6 4 and that
57. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
58. 426 U.S. at 131.
59. 373 U.S. at 600-01.
60. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 575.
61. Id at 577.

62. IcL at 567.
63. Winters v. United States, 143 F. at 749 (emphasis added).
64. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 576.
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the "Indians had command of the lands and the waters." ' 6 The
Court emphatically rejected arguments that "the means of irrigation
or that "the Indians ...
were deliberately given up by the Indians"
66
waters."
the
of
reservation
no
made
Winters suggests that while both the Indians and the United States
reserved water from the Milk River, either standing alone had the
power to do so. The Indians' power to reserve necessarily implies the
existence of aboriginal rights. While tribes relocated by the federal
government onto new reservations created for them from the public
domain 6 7 appear to have no claim to aboriginal rights, those tribes
with reservations located in whole or in part on their ancestral lands
may find support in Winters for their claims to aboriginal rights.6 8
Two factors require an assessment of how aboriginal water rights
might coexist with (or within) Winters. First, many tribes entitled to
Winters doctrine rights claim aboriginal rights. In fact, many tribes
now argue that Winters and its progeny constitute no more than
federal judicial cognizance of Indian aboriginal water rights under
another name.6 9 Second, some writers have attempted to shape the
aboriginal rights of the Rio Grande pueblos to Winters contours for
no more apparent reason than that the holders of both types of
rights are Indians. 7" Indeed, the pueblos concede much of the
rationale behind Winters, but not all of it, seems to apply to them.
Comparison of Winters rights, which are known, with aboriginal
rights, which remain largely unknown, might illuminate by analogy
the rights claimed by the pueblos.7 1
Three major inquiries govern the applicability and scope of the
Winters doctrine. The first concerns the establishment of a reservation, or whether the United States has set aside land for a specific
purpose; the second, when the reservation was made; and third, how
much water was reserved.
Where specific reservations have been carved out for Indians by
treaty or act of Congress, answering the first question is simple
enough, but for the Rio Grande pueblos a superficial inquiry will not
suffice. The pueblos' lands never have been part of the federal public
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Such as the five tribes whose rights were established by Arizona v. California, 376
U.S. 340 (1964).
68. Indian reservations located in part on former ancestral lands and in part on lands
reserved from the federal public domain may hold an aboriginal water right appurtenant to
their ancestral lands while they enjoy a federally reserved right for the remainder of their
reservation.
69. See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1109.
70. See, e.g., Nelson, The Winters Doctrine, University of Arizona Office of Arid Land
Studies 40 (1977).
71. Cf E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1974).
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domain; the 1858 confirmation issued by the United States is a
quitclaim deed which officially recognizes pre-existing Indian title.
This point often creates difficulty because the same 1858 act also has
been held to constitute an original conveyance of land from the
to certain non-Indian community land grants in New
United States
72
Mexico.
New Mexico community land grants, much like the pueblos of
California, were settled by European colonials from the sixteenth to
the nineteenth centuries. To encourage settlement in the New World,
the sovereign granted title to specific lands to each settler in fee
simple. In addition, the Crown often designated "common lands" to
which it retained title, but it granted the settlers a collective, permissive use of the areas for pastureland and wood gathering.
As between the land grants and the pueblos, the 1858 patent had
different effects. To the common lands of community land grants,
the patent was not a quitclaim because the Spanish and Mexican
sovereigns had not granted title to the lands to the inhabitants. Title
remained in the sovereign and passed to the United States by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 7 3 As to those common lands, then,
the 1858 federal act conveyed title to, rather than confirmed title in,
the grantees. 7 4 To the Indian pueblos and the holders of individual
grants however, the patent was simply congressional consummation
of a duty which arose as a result of Sections VIII and IX of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. It officially recognized vested property
rights which had been respected by the governments of Spain and
Mexico.
With respect to the private land grant claimants, the United States
Supreme Court has pointed out:
The United States, in dealing with parties claiming under Mexican
grants, lands within the territory ceded by Mexico, never made pretense that it was the owner of them. When, therefore, guided by the
action of the tribunals established to pass title upon the validity of
these alleged grants, the Government issued a patent, it was in the
nature of a quitclaim-an admission that the rightful ownership had
never been in the United States, but had passed at the time of
cession to the claimant, or to those under whom he claimed .... It is
perhaps more accurate to say that the 75action of the United States is
a confirmation rather than a quitclaim.
72. Bond v. Unknown Heirs of Barela, 16 N.M. 660, 120 P. 707 (1911).
73. Supra note 39.
74. Bond v. Unknown Heirs of Barela, 16 N.M. 660, 120 P. 707 (1911). For these
grantees, the patent is a time barrier behind which courts have refused to look to ascertain
the nature of any property interest the grantees may have held under prior sovereigns. Id
75. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217, 227 (1910)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Similarly with respect to the Rio Grande pueblos, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that in granting the
1858 patent, "the United States gave the pueblos a quitclaim deed to
lands which were recognized by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to
76
be in their ownership."
Such a confirmation never has been held to be a reservation for
Winters purposes, but as one authority has pointed out, "[w] hat
constitutes an Indian reservation is a question of fact."' ' Another
commentator has suggested that pueblos might be considered reservations (and thereby brought directly within Winters) by extending the
definition of a reservation to include areas subject to federal guardianship and control, even if the federal government never reserved
those areas from the federal public domain. 7 8 Such an extension is
quite possible. The United States Supreme Court never has embraced
a restrictive view of how federal reservations can be created and the
proposed extension would not run counter to the Court's rulings in
this area.
The second major inquiry Winters asks is, when was the reservation created? This issue is important because dating federal reserved
rights is the only way to fit them into a state law scheme based on
prior appropriation. Appropriators whose rights vested after the
reservation date are subject to the reserved right being fulfilled first;
appropriators with rights senior to the reservation are not. With most
reservations, the answer to this inquiry also is relatively easy-the
date of the federal action establishing the reservation.
For the Rio Grande pueblos, however, dating the reservation is
another difficult yet important inquiry. Theoretically, possible dates
range from 1933 (the date of the last congressional land act authorizing additional compensation for pueblo lands vested in nonIndians) 7 9 back to an immemorial date that reflects continuous
Indian occupancy of their lands for roughly nine centuries. A 1933
date on the Rio Grande would leave the pueblos little, if any, water.
An immemorial date would insure a supply adequate to meet virtually any quantification test. Naturally, and to make the inquiry
more difficult, many other dates between these suggest themselves as
well.
Deciding which date to use for the Rio Grande pueblos requires an
76. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1113. Thus for these Indians, the 1858 act was
not a source but a confirmation of rights, and the inquiry into earlier history and law, a
prohibited inquiry for land grants, is not only allowed but necessary in order to determine
the full scope of the rights at issue here.
77. Ranquist, supra note 53 at 663.
78. Comment, Pueblo Indian Water Rights: Who Will Get The Water? New Mexico v.
Aamodt, 18 NAT. RES. J. 639, 656 (1978).
79. Supra note 46.
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analysis of the purpose of dating a federal reservation. Notice-the
concept used by the California Supreme Court to establish and expand pueblo water rights in that state-is the basis underlying the
date of federal reservations. In recognizing the pueblo rights doctrine, the California Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that
non-pueblo water users had always known of and acknowledged the
pueblos' paramount rights. Similarly, state appropriators in watersheds encompassing federal reservations use water with notice that
their uses may ultimately be curtailed by expanding federal needs on
established reservations.
Every non-Indian who has appropriated waters from the Rio
Grande has to have known of the pueblos' existence. Certainly Henry
Winters, the famous appropriator from Montana, had no idea that
the rights of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation would eventually
curtail his Montana-granted rights. Yet the existence of the reservation in 1888 was enough to give the Indians priority over Winters'
1889 diversion date, even though the Indians began using water after
Mr. Winters did. 8" Similarly, the pueblos' presence for centuries
prior to European immigration into the Southwest and up the Rio
Grande valley argues for the application of an immemorial right.
Of the reserved rights cases, Winters itself is the most applicable in
answering the third inquiry; how to quantify the water rights of the
Rio Grande pueblos. The applicability of the irrigable acres standard
to the pueblos depends on the raison d'etre for the standard. In
Winters, the United States and the Indians agreed the Indians would
farm their new reservation. This transition to an agrarian economy
and the Indians' location on the high plains of Montana required that
the lands be irrigated in order to produce crops. Both the circuit
court and the Supreme Court recognized this change was one contemplated as part of the bargain made by the Indians and the United
States. 8 ' Thus, each court's adoption of an agricultural standard to
quantify the water right was naturally apropos to the situation
before it.
In later instances, the Supreme Court has elaborated that a Winters
right is usually quantified by measuring all of the irrigable acreage on
a reservation. 8 2 The point here is that the Court did not limit the
quantity of water to either the scope of agricultural production originally intended or that historically used by the Indians; their rights
80. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, aff'd, 148 F. 684 (6th Cir. 1906) and 207 U.S.
564 (1908).
81. Id., 143 F. at 745; 207 U.S. at 576.
82. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01. But see note 53, supra.
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encompassed water sufficient for all the irrigable lands of the reservation. Similarly, pueblo water rights in California were defined with
an eye to the future.8 Being somewhat like both Winters doctrine
Indian tribes and California pueblos, the Rio Grande pueblos might
derive some support from each.
The economic basis of the pueblos always has been agriculturetheir irrigation systems and farming methods had been well-established for centuries when Spaniards first happened upon the region. 84 Thus, irrigable acreage is an appropriate standard on which
to base pueblo water rights quantification, but not for the reasons
enunciated in Winters, which relied upon a mutual understanding and
express treaty language to tie in agriculture. Pueblo water rights are
linked to agriculture by nine centuries of history. This alone justifies
quantification of the pueblos' water rights by a measure of irrigable
acreage.
Irrigation water for how much land? For California pueblos, water
rights have grown with the needs of the pueblo and its successor city.
Historically, the territory of the Rio Grande pueblos, on the other
hand, always has been limited to known boundaries. Within those
boundaries, however, the pueblos have always held a right to use all
their resources-that dominion over resources was precisely the basis
for defining pueblo territory. The pueblos' irrigable acreage, therefore, must be limited to the lands within their boundaries, much like
Winters reservations. But, like California pueblo water rights, Rio
Grande pueblo rights might extend to the pueblos' boundaries, unconfined by historical or present uses.
Thus, pueblo water rights are tied to agriculture by history, but
could grow like California pueblo water rights. Put another way,
pueblo rights like those of Winters tribes could extend to all of their
irrigable lands whether or not those lands are now under cultivation.
The court, then, might apply the same standard as set forth in Winters, but for different reasons. Evidently, Congress has not concluded
otherwise. It recognized that the extent of pueblo lands formed the
basis for the pueblos' water rights when it specifically included water
rights in the formula used to compensate the pueblos for the lands
they lost to white settlers.8 I
Pueblo water rights look like Winters rights, but absent an extension of Winters they are not. The distinctions are important. Pueblo
water rights are based on a unique history of pueblo uses and status.
83. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
84. F. COHEN, supra note 7.
85. See H. R. REP. NO. 123, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933).
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Winters rights, like all reserved water rights, are linked to a reservation created out of public lands. On the other hand, pueblo lands
never have been a part of the federal public domain but always have
been Indian lands.
At this juncture, two routes exist for the court to follow. The first
and more expeditious action would be to extend Winters to the
pueblos and apply the reserved rights doctrine to define their water
rights. Setting a rational reservation date would remain the major
problem following such a determination. The other alternative for
the court would be to recognize the unique history of the pueblos
and accord them a new species of water right which is truly aboriginal-one with an immemorial priority date and which is quantified
by using either the irrigable acres standard or another appropriate to
the pueblos' history.8
Some tribes urge that the Winters doctrine is simply a judicial
confirmation of their pre-existing aboriginal water rights.8 7 This
position is difficult to accept for the simple reason that many tribes
endowed with Winters rights have been moved onto reservations of
land which are not coextensive with their original tribal domain. It is
difficult to conceive any basis for arguing that the tribe brought with
it a severable, aboriginal water right.
In addition, it may be a poor tactical decision for many tribes to
seek aboriginal rights unless they are certain of winning a quantification standard more generous than the "practically irrigable acreage"
yardstick of Winters. Virtually the only potential gain in obtaining a
better standard would be the rights to all of the water in a particular
basin-a political impossibility. There are many standards which
would result in the quantification of aboriginal rights at a lower
figure than the one reached using the Winters standards. Furthermore, many tribes lack a history similar to that of the Rio Grande
pueblos or the Ft. Belknap Indians supporting an aboriginal claim. In
short, many tribes have nothing to gain and much to lose by forsaking their Winters rights for aboriginal rights.
IV. OTHER ABORIGINAL RIGHTS ISSUES

Several other aspects of aboriginal rights deserve exploration.
These include (1) the amenability of aboriginal rights to state court
86. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d at 1111. The Tenth Circuit recognized that "the
decisions recognizing reserved water rights. . . are not technically applicable," id., but suggested that further factual development would be required in order to construct an appropriate definition of the pueblos' water rights.
87. Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council, CAM, 52-56 (n.d.).
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jurisdiction and water adjudication actions therein; (2) groundwater,
and (3) the uses to which waters diverted under an aboriginal right
might be put.
A. State Jurisdiction
Advancing its affinity for expanded state court jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court recently held that the waiver of federal
sovereign immunity for state court determination of federal water
rights, the McCarran Amendment,8 8 included those water rights held
in trust by the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes-Winters
doctrine rights.8 9 One of the first questions raised by the existence
of aboriginal water rights is whether they too can be litigated in state
court.
Although no court yet has faced this issue, several factors suggest
state courts do have jurisdiction over aboriginal rights. The McCarran
Amendment waived federal sovereign immunity for adjudication of
water rights owned by the United States. The Globe Equity Decree,
which accorded an immemorial priority date to certain Indian uses
on the Gila River, expressly stated the United States owned these
water rights for the Indians.9" Thus the most aboriginal of all Indian
water rights yet recognized fits within McCarran. In addition, the
well-recognized fact of plenary congressional control over Indian
affairs, including Indian property, supports this result.9 1
Yet to be determined is whether joinder of an Indian tribe in its
own right as a party to a water adjudication is prerequisite to a
determination of aboriginal water rights and, if so, whether P.L.
280' 2 authorizes such a joinder by a state court.9
Assuming arguendo that aboriginal rights were owned by the
tribes, the Indians' efforts to stay out of state courts would be an
uphill effort because of the demand for comprehensive adjudication
88. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. §666 (1976) provides in part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or
(2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit.
89. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
90. See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., Globe Equity No. 59 at 6, 86 (D.
Ariz. June 29, 1935); but see note 27 supra.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
92. 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
93. State jurisdiction over Indians is extremely state-specific and complex. For a remarkably lucid survey, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 525 (1975).
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of all western water rights. Congress passed the McCarran Amendment in an effort to avoid the piecemeal decrees which would result
if the United States could not be joined to have its water rights
quantified in the same state court proceedings as all others.' 4
This impetus, combined with the Supreme Court's expansion of
state court jurisdiction, produced the 1976 decision known as the
Akin case, 9" which held Winters doctrine rights were within state
grasp under the McCarran Amendment. In that case, the Court
appeared unconcerned with its prior holdings requiring that congressional surrender of jurisdiction to the states over Indian affairs be
express (McCarran does not mention Indian water rights), or the fact
that Winters rights are qualitatively different from other federally
reserved rights. 9" Compared to the leap made by the Akin case,
extending the McCarran Amendment to include aboriginal rights
would be a small step, particularly in light of the expressed congressional goal of eliminating jurisdictional hurdles to the comprehensive
adjudication of western water rights in state courts.
Finally, aboriginal water rights may be a creature of state law.
Litigation is pending to decide that issue. 9 7 To deny state courts
jurisdiction over a matter of state law would be an absurd result. But
even if aboriginal rights are the product of federal law, aboriginal
rights litigation may be headed for state courts. 9 8
B. Groundwater
Do aboriginal water rights extend to groundwater? Probably so. If
they are a new subspecies of federally reserved rights, aboriginal
rights fit directly within Cappaert v. United States9 I which suggested
that reserved rights may well include groundwater. If aboriginal
rights are not reserved rights but a new type of federal right, Cappaert is still strong authority for the argument that federal law does
94. S. REP. NO. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
95. 424 U.S. 800. The name of the case as decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
Many water adjudications are known by names beginning with the letter "A" because all
potential claimants on a stream system are usually named in alphabetical order as defendants in the case. See, e.g., State of New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D.
Wash. July 23, 1979).
96. Note, State Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Indian Reserved Water Rights, 18 NAT. RES.
J. 221, 225 (1978).
97. United States v. Smith, No. 78-1869 (9th Cir., filed April 19, 1978).
98. In fact, given the current state initiative in this area, Aamodt, filed in 1966, prior to
the Akin decision, may be one of the last cases in which Indian water rights will be
determined by a federal court.
99. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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not distinguish tributary groundwater from hydrologically connected
surface streams.' 0 0 If aboriginal rights are grounded in state law, an
examination of the situs state's groundwater law will be necessary to
determine whether aboriginal rights extend to groundwater.
C. Permissible Uses For Aboriginal Water Rights
Finally, it seems likely that holders of aboriginal rights are no
more limited in the uses of their water than are tribes holding Winters rights. The debate concerning permissible Indian uses began with
the "irrigable acres" standard endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California. Proponents of Indian water
rights argue that Indians could do as they pleased with their
water.' 01 Those on the other side contend the irrigible acres standard implicitly limited tribal uses to agriculture.' 02 The Supreme
Court's recent supplemental decree in Arizona v. California stated
that "the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights
[of Indians] shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to
irrigation or other agricultural application." ' 0" This statement seems
to have settled the issue, although the Court supplied no explicit
basis or reason for this holding. The same rule might apply to aboriginal rights as well.
V. EFFECTS OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

The potential effects of aboriginal water rights depend largely
upon their priority and quantification. An immemorial priority date
coupled with a large quantification standard could disrupt existing
water rights in a given basin. Aboriginal water rights of later dates
would have to be evaluated in the context of other vested rights
within a stream system or an aquifer.
In their most potent immemorial form, aboriginal water rights
theoretically could displace any other type of water right which has
been recognized. If the United States were to recognize the existence
of vested rights pre-dating federal sovereignty, those rights would
have priority over all federally created rights, including federally
reserved rights, Winters doctrine rights, and contractual rights to
100. Cf Grow & Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as FederalCommon Law, 10 NAT. RES.
L. 457 (1977).
101. Veeder, Indian Prior and ParamountRights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 631 (1970).
102. Clyde, Special ConsiderationsInvolvingIndian Rights, 8 NAT. RES. L. 237 (1975).

103. 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979).
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project waters administered by the Bureau of Reclamation. Water
rights held under state law would be displaced as well.'04 Tribes
holding aboriginal rights to large quantities of water could become
wholesale water brokers in the West.
This result seems unlikely for several reasons. If aboriginal rights
are found to exist, the United States might, as it did in the Globe
Equity case, successfully assert ownership of those rights as guardian
and trustee on behalf of the Indians. While such a result may appear
anomalous to the very concept of an aboriginal right, federal guardianship over Indian property is deeply rooted in the nation's history.
Furthermore, federal guardianship would assure continued control
over a significant portion of western water by the Secretary of Interior, control the federal executive is reluctant to relinquish.
In addition, congressional control over Indian affairs, including
property rights, is plenary, 0 and although Congress thus far has
declined to tamper with the judicially created Winters doctrine,' 06
no one seriously questions its power to do so. If aboriginal rights
present a sufficient threat to the established order of western water
rights administration, demands for congressional intervention will
become increasingly difficult to ignore.' 0 7
This article has not explored the political foundations or ramifications of aboriginal rights. These factors, however, are undoubtedly
more important than the legal theories. While perfectly credible legal
arguments can be advanced for the recognition of many varieties of
aboriginal water rights, politics will have an even greater effect on the
final result. This is not to say that legal theories of aboriginal water
rights are insignificant; quite simply they must be placed in perspective. As the Indians have learned, compromise is inevitable.' 08
The Navajo experience on the Upper Colorado River is a case in
104. Although title to water rights held under the appropriation laws of the western
states was not created directly by the federal government, affirmative federal acts were
required to sever the water from the lands and subject the water to appropriation under
local custom and later, state law. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155 (1935). Aboriginal rights antedated federal dominion, the severance
of water from the land and the existence of the western states. As a result, aboriginal rights
arguably are superior to all others.
105. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
106. See Indian Water Rights: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
107. For a discussion of the factors motivating passage of the McCarran Amendment,
see S. REP. NO. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
108. But, the Aamodt trial court recently stated: "I do not intend, and will not, incorporate a balancing of interests in determining the quantification of the federal, and then the
state, law claims. There is no basis in the law for such a balancing." (October 24, 1978 letter
from Judge E. L. Mechem to All Counsel of Record at 2.)
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point. Given the vast size of the Navajo Reservation, quantification of
the tribe's Winters doctrine rights might well dry up the Colorado
River.1 0 ' But water rights on paper are far removed from running
ditches and green fields. In order to secure development funds for
the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP), the tribe had to agree to
put the priority of its Winters rights on parity with the Bureau of
Reclamation's San Juan-Chama Diversion Project. Even then, NIIP
funding from Congress has lagged 10 years behind the companion
reclamation project.' 1 0
There is no reason to believe that aboriginal water rights holders
will be able to avoid the Navajo experience entirely. Even though it
diverts water under an immemorial priority date, the Gila River
Indian Reservation must share water shortages with users holding
junior rights.1 11
VI. CONCLUSION
American Indians have long realized that the gap between their
theoretical rights and the real world is a larger one than for most
Americans. Under the threat of congressional power to abrogate their
superior water rights, whether held under the Winters doctrine or a
theory of aboriginal rights, the Indian tribes must recognize that they
can do only so well in securing water rights for their people. They
cannot realistically expect the federal government, through its judicial, legislative, or executive branches, to grant the tribes water rights
which, while arguably justifiable legally, might hamper severely the
well being of non-Indians competing for those same limited resources.
Aboriginal rights represent another legal theory which could
endow tribes with paper power, some of which they probably will
have to bargain away in order to gain real world benefits.' 12 In this
109. The rights of five tribes along the Lower Colorado River with relatively small land
area in comparison with the Navajo reservation were quantified at nearly one million acrefeet annually by the Special Master in Arizona v. California. The Supreme Court endorsed
this quantification, 373 U.S. at 600-01, and incorporated it into its decree, 376 U.S. at
344-45.
110. See generally, Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice:
Navajo Experience in the Colorado River, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 97 (Winter 1976).
111. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz., June
29, 1935).
112. The Supplemental Decree in Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), may be
read as tacit recognition of this reality. In refusing to restrict Indian uses of their Winters
water to agricultural applications, the Court has never addressed the permissible use issue as
a legal one.
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context, aboriginal rights are nothing really new. But in a more
subtle sense, aboriginal rights do offer something. Winters doctrine
rights are based largely upon actions of the United States-white
man's history. Aboriginal rights, on the other hand, rest on Indian
history-in the case of the Rio Grande pueblos, on nine centuries of
continuous Indian occupation of the same lands. That history is a
heritage with which aboriginal rights are in harmony. Whether and in
what form these rights exist, however, remains to be seen.

